But copycat capitalism is not without risk; indeed, it is unlikely to end without someone getting scratched. The West's efforts to emulate China are hindered by its inability to replicate the conditions of Chinese growth, such as labour mobilisation, and its unwillingness to pursue practices such as the one-child policy. Thus, the West's forays into state capitalism are more likely to result in the misallocation of capital, more in the vein of China's vastly oversupplied steel industry but without the stellar headline economic performance of the national economy. Coming from the other direction, China's crawl toward a more market-oriented brand of capitalism also has potential pitfalls. We need look no further than its recent problems with so-called wealth- management products (WMPs) for evidence that reform intentions without adequate regulatory institutions can cause problems.

WMPs were commonly marketed to individuals as alternatives to deposit accounts. But the funds contributed were then invested in riskier assets that included 'trust loans’ to companies such as property developers. The number of trust loans rose by 40% in 2012, which triggered serious concern among China's authorities that WMPs could become the next financial WMDs [weapons of mass destruction], because banks had strong incentives to make uneconomic lending decisions. The subsequent state-directed WMP regulation put a brake on credit creation and sent Chinese stock markets plunging. Ultimately, however, the measures should enable China's shadow banking system to continue to grow at a more manageable pace and in a more sustainable way. There is a risk that the lack of growth in the West may make economic transformation in the direction of the Chinese model appear more urgent to its governments. But the Western economic model has brought about unprecedented standards of living. This achievement should not be dismissed because of one crisis, no matter how prolonged, and the economic model that produced today's living standards should not be cast aside without careful consideration.

By contrast, China's rapid growth should not obscure its need for economic change. According to the International Monetary Fund, at some point between 2020 and 2025, China will pass what economists call the 'Lewis turning point’, at which a country's vast supply of low-cost workers is exhausted and factors such as labour mobilisation provide a diminishing contribution to growth. With smaller demographic and resource advantages in the coming years, the consequences of capital misallocation, unavoidable under a state-directed economic model, will come to the fore. As China's recent experience with WMPs demonstrates, economic change can expose old problems and create new ones. Ironically, China's transformation from a state-directed to a market-driven economy may require the greatest amount of planning of all. Alexander Friedman Global Chief Investment Officer, UBS Wealth Management Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2013.

但模仿的资本主义并不是没有风险 的,最后总有人要受到损失。西方模 仿中国的障碍在于它无法复制中国增 长的条件(比如劳动力动员能力), 也不願贯彻某些措施(比如计划生 育)。因此,西方突然转向国家资本 主义更可能导致资本的错误配置,重 蹈中国钢铁工业供给大量过剩的覆 辙,卻又不像中國那樣有著耀眼的国 民经济表现。 另一方面,中国向市场导向的资本主 义逐渐迈进的過程,也有潜在陷阱。 只消看看其最近爆出的所谓理财产品 问题,就可以清楚地看到,空有改革 意圖而沒有適當的监管制度配合,会 产生大问题。 理财产品通常作为储蓄存款的替代品而 向个人销售,但由此集中起来的资金, 卻投资于高风险资产,包括流向房地 产开发商等公司的“信托贷款”。2012 年,信托贷款数量增加了40%,引起了 中国当局對于理财产品可能成为下一个 金融“大规模杀伤性武器”的严重担 忧,因为银行有很大的誘因做出不符合 经济原則的贷款决策。 其後国家指導的理财产品监管给信用 创造踩了一脚急刹车,也让中国股市 暴跌。但是,这些措施最終可以让中国的影子银行系统以可駕馭的速度实 现更加可持续的增长。